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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This is a property case, involving a land lease between Appellants and Respondent Coeur
d'Alene Placer Mining Company (hereinafter "Coeur d'Alene Placer"); Coeur d'Alene Placer's
sale to Respondent IFG Timber, L.L.C. (hereinafter "IFG"); and IFG's attempt to eject
Appellants from the proper1y that is the subject of this action. Appellants contend that, through
their reliance on repeated representations and assurances by officers and agents of Coeur d'Alene
Placer, Appellants had a right of first refusal with regard to the property, or in the event that
Appellants did not purchase the Property, there was an agreement Coeur d'Alene Placer would
purchase Appellants' buildings. While these were oral agreements, Appellants further contend
that Respondents are estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds under the "estoppel"
exception due to Appellants reliance upon Coeur d'Alene Placer's statements.

As such,

Appellants seek remedies for breach of these agreements, and also contest the ejectment action.

B.

Course of the Proceedings

The Complaint was filed on or about June 30, 2014. Respondent Coeur d'Alene Placer
Answered, and Respondent IFG likewise Answered, seeking a counter-claim for common law
Ejectment and damages. R. at 117-23 and 29-116. Both respondents subsequently moved for
Judgment on the Pleadings, followed by a Motion for Summary Judgment (setting forth
essentially the same arguments) on Appellants' claims against Respondents, which was granted
by the District Court. R. at 129-248. IFG then sought summary judgment on its Counterclaim,
which was likewise granted. R. at 255-282. Appellants moved for Reconsideration on all grants
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of Summary Judgment, R. at 301
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and the Motions for Reconsideration were denied on or

about October 19, 2015. R. at 323. It is from these grants of Summary Judgment and denials of
Reconsideration that Appellants appeal.

C.

Concise Statement of the Facts

In or about August of 1995, Appellants purchased several buildings located upon the
property that is subject to this action from one Francis Gitter, for use as a residence and
outbuildings.

Record (R.) at 7.

The buildings had been located upon the Property since

approximately the 1950's, and had been owned separately from the land since they were placed
thereon, but had likewise been leased to Appellants' predecessors-in-interest. At the time of
Appellants' purchase and as of the date of this Brief, the buildings were, and are, not movable.

Id.. Upon purchase of the buildings, Appellants entered into a lease of the underlying real
property with Respondent Coeur d'Alene Placer Mining Co. (hereinafter "Coeur d'Alene Placer).

Id. While the lease between Appellants and Coeur d'Alene Placer was a renewable annual lease,
Wilfred and Elizabeth Gardner (hereinafter "the Gardners"), who were officers/agents of Coeur
d'Alene Placer, regularly visited Appellants, and repeatedly assured Appellants that, in the event
that Coeur d'Alene Placer decided not to renew the lease, that Coeur d'Alene Placer would either
give Appellants a right of first refusal on the Property, or purchase the buildings from Appellants
at their assessed value. R. at 7-8. In reliance upon these promises, Appellants continued to
reside upon the Property, and maintain/improve the same. R. at 8. The Gardners personally
observed and commented favorably upon Appellants' maintenance/improvements. R. at 164.
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Following the death ,)f Wilfred Gardner, communication between Appellants and Coeur
d'Alene Placer was significantly reduced, but Appellants continued to renew the lease, as before,
in reliance upon the Gardners'/Coeur d'Alene Placer's prior assurances. R. at 160. On or about
June 23, 2012, Mr. Nicholson met with a real estate agent by the name of Kevin Boling
(hereinafter "Boling"), who purported to be working on behalf of Coeur d'Alene Placer. Boling
discussed the possibility that Coeur d'Alene Placer would be selling its property to the Bureau of
Land Management, but referenced Appellants' right of first refusal, and the possibility of a sale
to Appellants. Boling then I.old Mr. Nicholson that he would keep in contact with Appellants. R.
at 8-9.
Approximately six days later, Appellant W. Michael Nicholson observed survey activity
occurring near the Property, and was informed that the survey had been commissioned by
Boling. However, neither Boling nor Coeur d'Alene Placer made contact with Appellants until
December of 2013 (nearly a year and a half later), at which point Appellants received a letter
from Boling, referencing a pending sale and mentioning the possibility of a sale to Appellants,
but containing no offer. Id. At no point did Boling communicate an offer to sell the Property or
purchase the buildings. Id..
In the summer of 2012, Appellants became aware that Coeur d'Alene Placer was in the
process of selling a neighboring portion of the Property to two persons, who had likewise been
leasing from Coeur d'Alene Placer under a similar arrangement, but Appellants received no
further communication from Coeur d'Alene Placer until February of 2014, when they received a
letter from Coeur d'Alene Placer's then legal counsel stating that they were not going to renew
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the lease. R. at 8-10. Appellants' counsel responded with an offer with regard to the Property, to
which Coeur d'Alene Placer's counsel eventually responded to the effect that the offer would be
passed on, but that he was skeptical as to whether it would be accepted. R. at 17-19. After no
further communication frorn Coeur d'Alene Placer or its then-counsel, Appellants' counsel
learned upon following up with Coeur d'Alene Placer's counsel that the Property had been sold to
Defendant IFG Timber, L.L.C. (hereinafter "IFG") and that IFG was not interested in dealing
with Appellants with regard to the Property. R. at 10, 22-23. Subsequently, Appellants filed the
instant action.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Appellant presents the following Issues on Appeal:
A.

Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment to Respondents on

Appellants' claims on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact, thus entitling
them to a judgment as a matter of law with regard to Plaintiffs claims? In so holding:
1.

Did the District Court err in holding that the improvements to the Property

could not constitute reasonable reliance so as to apply the "estoppel" exception to the
Statute of frauds?
11.

Based upon the evidence in the record, did the District Court err in holding

that Plaintiffs' option to purchase was exercised and rejected?
111.

Did the District Court err in holding that Defendants have the right to

retain ownership of the buildings and improvements upon the Property, without
compenation to Plaintiffs for the same?

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

4

B.

Did the Di:;trict Court err in granting Summary Judgment on Counter-

claimant IFG's Counter-claim for Ejectment, on the grounds that there was no genuine
issue of material fact, thus entitling it to judgment as a matter of law with regard to the
same? In so holding:
1.

Did the District Court err in applying Chapter 3, Title 6, Idaho Code to

IFG's Counter-claim, when said Counter-claim was brought as a common-law Ejectment
Claim;
11.

Alternatively, if Chapter 3, Title 6 does apply, did the District Court err in

entering judgment for monetary damages in the same action as for possession of the Real
Property?
iii.

Did the District Court err in rejecting Appellants' claim that the Counter-

claim lacked a sufficient legal description, and by applying the description of the
Property contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint in entering judgment on the Counter-claim?

III.

A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a grant of Summary Judgment de novo. Taylor v. McNichols, 149
Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010). A Motion for Reconsideration is reviewed pursuant
to an abuse of discretion standard. Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 251 P .3d 602, 610 (2011 ).

B.

The District Court Erred in Granting Partial Summary Judgment on

Appellants' Claims Against Respondents.

1.

Standard for Summary Judgment.
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In ruling upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must consider whether or not
"the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is ... [a] genuine issues as to any material fact," and whether the Respondents are "entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards applicable to
summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally construe facts in the existing record

in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor
of the nonmoving party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991)
(emphasis added) (construing Idaho Rule Civil Procedure 56(c), modeled after, and substantially
similar to, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)).
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is [an]
issue for trial [ifj there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return

a verdict for that party." Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P .2d 117, 118 (1990)
(emphasis added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit further explained
the term "genuine" as being "sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve

the issue in favor either side." National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735
(1995). In the same case, it further defined "material" as "a fact that has the capacity to sway the
outcome of the litigation under the applicable law." Id.

To put it another way, summary

judgment is appropriate only if "reasonable minds cannot differ" as to the position offered by the
moving party, based upon the evidence available in the record.
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Since, based upon the evidence currently

the record, a rational trier

fact could

reasonably find that the Plaintiffs have: (1) established the elements of estoppel, excepting the
agreements regarding the right of first refusal and agreement to purchase the buildings from the
Statute of Frauds; (2) that there were said agreements in places between Appellants and Coeur
d'Alene Placer; (3) that Coeur d'Alene Placer breached said agreements; and (5) that IFG did not
have the right to eject Appellants from the Property (in addition to the facial deficiencies on the
Ejectrnent counter-claim) Respondents are not entitled to a "judgment as a matter of law."
Therefore, the District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment should be VACATED, and this
matter REMANDED back to the District Court for further proceedings.

2.

The District Court Erred in Holding that the Improvements to the Property Could Not

Constitute Reasonable Reliance so as to Apply the Estoppel Exception to the Statute of Frauds.
The crux of the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment was that the Statute of
Frauds, codified in Idaho at Idaho Code §§ 9-503 and 28-2-201, rendered any oral agreement
between Appellants and Respondents invalid. R. at 248-53. Appellants, however, contend that
their reliance upon the representations by the Gardners, as agents of Coeur d'Alene Placer, in
leasing the property,

renewing the lease, and improving the property places the agreement

within the "estoppel" exception to the Statute of Frauds.

R. at 231-32. "A [party] who is

induced to rely on an oral agreement and who changes position to his own detriment cannot be
defrauded by a [party] who interposes the Statute of Frauds to declare the agreement invalid."

Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 110 Idaho 804, 807,
718 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Ct. App. 1986). In the Idaho Migrant Council case, the Court of Appeals
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also went on to say that, "since IMC's complaint states sufficient facts on its face to support a
claim of reliance, Northwestern may not interpose the Statute of Frauds ... " Id. Similarly,
here, the Appellants have stated many facts in their Complaint to support a claim for reliance.

See Complaint, ,r,r 2.5-2.9, 4.2-4.3, R. at 7-8, 12. As Respondents did not submit additional
affidavits based upon personal knowledge or admissible evidence in support of their Motion for

Summary Judgment, Appellants' allegations remain uncontroverted. Since it cannot be said that,
viewing the allegations in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, it is clear that the
Plaintiff is entitled to no relief on this basis, Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment should
have been denied on the grounds that Appellants have created a genuine issue of material fact
that Defendants are estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds based on Appellants
substantial reliance upon the oral agreement.
On this issue of reliance, the District Court held that Plaintiffs' improvements to the
Property could not constitute reasonable reliance so as to except the oral agreements from the
Statute of Frauds, relying primarily upon a provision in the lease stating that such consent to
such improvements must be made in writing. Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order for Partial Summary Judgment") at 3, R. at 250. See

also Affidavit of Theron DeSmet in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B
(hereinafter "Lease"),

,r 9, R.

at 175-80. However, Respondents failed to present evidence in

opposition to Plaintiffs' assertion that the Gardners, as agents of Coeur d'Alene Placer, personally
viewed the improvements, and gave consent to the same. See Complaint, ,r,r 2.9, 6.2, R. at 8, 13;
Affidavit of Theron DeSmet in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A
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(hereinafter "Plaintiffs' Discovery Responses"), pp. 9-10 (Answer to Interrogatory No. 10), R. at
163-64. This Court has held that contractual provisions requiring that a waiver from contractual
terms be in writing may, themselves, likewise be waived. See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Life
and Accident Co., 93 Idaho 348, 355, 461 P.2d 243, 250 (1969). Therefore, there remains a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Gardners, through their conduct, waived
any potential claim on the part of Coeur d'Alene Placer that said improvements were in

contravention of the lease and, therefore, that the improvements constituted reasonable reliance
upon the Gardners' representations. As such, Summary Judgment was not appropriate on this
finding, and this Court should grant reverse the same.
3.

The District Court Erred in Holding That the Option Was Exercised and Rejected.
Alternatively, the District Court held that "as a matter of law, CDA placer did not not

breach the Agreements," and that the option was exercised and rejected.

Order for Partial

Summary Judgment at 3-4, R. at 250-51 .. However, the offer from Appellants to Coeur d'Alene
Placer was not made until q/ter, and in response to the Notice of Termination received from their
then-counsel in early 2014. Complaint,

,r,r 2.20-2.21, R. at

10. In fact, the "rejection" was not

communicated to Appellants or their counsel until after the sale to IFG had apparently taken
place. Affidavit of James McMillan in Opposition to Counterclaimant's Motion for Summary
Judgment ,r,r 3-4, R. at 275-76. As such, to the extend that the offer from Respondents could be
construed as an exercise of their option to purchase, the sale to IFG prior to communicating the
rejection of the same remains a breach of the agreement. Therefore, again, there remains a

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

9

genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the Agreements were breached, and the Court
should likewise vacate and remand on these grounds.

4.

The District Court Erred in Holding that Respondents Have the Right to Retain

Ownership of the Buildings and Improvements on the Property Without Compensation to
Plaintiffs.
Finally, in granting Partial Summary Judgment, the District Court found that the Lease
"includes the right to right to retain ownership of any improvements" and that such '"was the
benefit of the bargain under the Land Lease." Order for Partial Summary Judgment at 5-6, R. at
252-53.

It was unclear whether this is a reference to the "improvements, alterations, or

additions" referenced in Paragraph 9 of the Lease, the provision regarding disposition of
Plaintiffs' personal property and buildings contained in Paragraph 18 of the Lease, or both. Of
particular concern to Appellm1ts are the buildings and disposition of the same, which is expressly
discussed in Paragraph 18.
Paragraph 18 provides, in relevant part:
In the event of TENANT'S failure to remove any of TENANT'S property from
the Property, LANDLORD is hereby authorized, without liability to TENANT for
loss or damage thereto, at the sole risk of TENANT, to remove and store any such
property at TENANT'S expense, or to retain such property under LANDLORD'S
control, or to sell at public or private sale, without notice, any or all of the
property not so removed and to apply the net proceeds of such sale to the payment
of any sum due hereunder, or to destroy such property. Further, to secure
TENANT'S obligations under this Section 19, LANDLORD is hereby granted a
security interest in said property (including proceeds and after acquired property)
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
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assertion that it would
Respondents did not produce any evidence contradicting Plaintiffs
portion of the paragraph, are
be impossible to remove the buildings (which, in a preceding
Therefore, this paragraph, by
included within the same by definition), without destroying them.
es the forfeiture of the same
its terms, (a) creates a lien on Appellants' buildings; and (b) requir
opportunity to redeem the same.
upon the expiration of the Lease if there is no renewal, with no
ngs, Respondents fail to
To the extent that the agreement creates a lien on the buildi
Uniform Commercial Code.
provide evidence that said lien was perfected pursuant to the Idaho
created by the contract remains
Idaho Code § 28-9-301 et seq. As such, any lien purported to be
unperfected.
by Idaho Code § 45-110,
Next, such a contract for forfeiture is expressly prohibited
which clearly states that

in
"all contracts for the forfeiture of property subject to a lien,

cts in restraint of the right of
satisfaction of the obligation secured thereby, and all contra
make the damage agreed to an
redemption from a lien, are void." Furthermore, "where the facts

Ellis v. Butterfield, 98 Idaho 644,
unconscionable penalty, equity will intercede to grant relief."
of the statute and the general
648, 570 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1977). Therefore, given the effect
ndents are not, as a matter of law,
equitable principle against an unconscionable forfeiture, Respo
on to Plaintiffs for the same.
entitled to retain, sell, or destroy the buildings without compensati
n in granting Partial Summary
As such, to the extent that the District Court relied upon this sectio
Judgment, vacation and remand of such holding is warranted.

C.

on Respondent IFG's
The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment

Counter-claim Against Appellants.
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1.

Code to IFG's CounterThe District Court Erred in Applying Chapter 3, Title 6, Idaho

ent for Monetary Damages in the
claim, Alternatively, the District Court Erred in Entering Judgm
Same Action.
im, the District Court
In its decision granting Summary Judgment on IFG's Counter-cla
wful detainer."
found that Plaitniffs/Counter-defendants were guilty of "unla

Memorandum

IFG Timber LLC's Motion for
Decision and Order Granting Defendant/Counterclaimant
ary Judgment") at 6, R. at 287.
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order Granting IFG Summ
t holding over following the
However, while Plaintiffs rr;:cognize that an allegation of a tenan
statute, Idaho Code § 6-303(1),
expiration of a lease would fall within Idaho's Unlawful Detainer
d. See Answer of IFG Timber
IFG elected to counter-claim for common-law ejectment instea
R. at 35-39. Further, even if the
LLC and Counterclaim at 7-11 (hereinafter "Counterclaim"),
IFG's inclusion of a claim for
Counter-claim could be deemed a claim for Unlawful Detainer,
Idaho 176, 181, 226 P. 736, 737
damages within the same was improper. Coe v. Bennett, 39
action
(1924) (holding that an Unlawful Detainer action and a cause of

for money damages could

not be joined in a single suit).
IFG's Counterclaim, and
Therefore, Title 6, Chapter 3 of Idaho Code does not apply to
ary Judgment to the extent the
this Court should vacate and remand the decision granting Summ
chapter 3 did apply, the District
District Court relied upon the same. Alternatively, if Title 6,
same action.
Court erred in granting judgm ent for monetary damages in the

12

2.

The District Court Erred in Rejecting Appellant's Claim that the Counter-Claim Lacked a

Sufficient Legal Description and by Applying Appellants' Use of the Postal Address in the
Complaint to the Counter-Claim.
On the issue of the legal description, the District Court ruled, essentially, that the issue of
the legal description was not properly brought before the Court, and that the description in
Appellants' Complaint was sufficient.

Order Granting IFG Summary Judgment at 12-13, R. at

293-94. On its first finding, the District Court cited to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(e),
56(c), 7(b)(3), and 8(c). However, in raising this argument, Appellants were not bringing any
further new evidence before the Court (56(e)), attempting to include it within written briefing in
an untimely manner (56(c)), nor making a written motion for dismissal (or otherwise) (7(b)(3)
(an inadequate legal description is not enumerated as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c)).
Rather, Appellants were arguing that, due to a facial deficiency in IFG's pleading on file herein,
it was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. However, even if the District Court were
correct in its conclusion that the argument was not properly raised at that time, the issue was
properly raised on reconsideration, pursuant to this Court's decision in Arregui v. Gallegos-Main,
153 Idaho 801,808,291 P.3d 1000, 1007 (2012) and the Court of Appeals' decision in Johnson

v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. App. 2006).
IFG's Counterclaim cites to an attached exhibit for the legal description of the property
they are attempting to recover from Appellants. Counterclaim,

11

1-3, R. at 35. The attached

"Exhibit A" contains two portions: A first page setting forth the "A.J. Prichard Mineral Survey
567 and Combination Placer Mineral Survey 1762, Located at Section 35, Township 50 North,
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a lengthy attachment, also entitled "Exhibit
Range 4 East B.M. Shoshone County, Idaho", then
ased from Coeur d'Alene Placer by IFG.
'A'," which seems to describe all of the land purch
Counterclaim does not set forth the portion
Counterclaim, Exhibit A, R. at 41-89. However, the
other claims that are subject to the lease,
of the A.J. Prichard, Comblnation, or various sundry
ined on the face of the lease, the acreage of
nor, curiously, does it set forth the description conta
erty. Id. IFG simply alleges that Plaintiffs
the leasehold, or even the street address of the Prop

13, R. at 35.
were leasing "a portion" of the same. Counterclaim,
Appellants' claims, the allegations
Following the grant of Partial Summary Judgment on
Court; rather, the remaining issue was IFG's
in the Complaint were no longer before the District
nature, is a separate cause against the
counterclaim. Moreover, a counterclaim, by its very
tiffs claim against a defendant. Further,
Plaintiff in a case, rather than an addition to the Plain
iption by reference, or otherwise plead it in
not only does IFG not incorporate Appellants' descr
uacy of Plaintiffs' description. Answer of
its counterclaim, but in its own Answer denies the adeq
IFG ,, 7, R. at 30.
aim, even if accepted as true, it
Therefore, based on IFG's allegations in its Countercl
iff which "portion" of the A.J. Prichard,
essentially places in the discretion of the Sher
hment, from which to eject the Plaintiffs.
Combination, and/or other claims contained in the attac
following receipt of the Lease in the course
IFG, at no point, sought to Amend its counterclaim
bring its Counterclaim in compliance with
of Discovery, or otherwise took the opportunity to
Court, seeking the recovery of possession
Rule 90). Thus, the Counterclaim, as presented to the
was not entitled to judgment as a matter of
of real property, is facially insufficient. As such, IFG
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and remand the District Court's grant of
law thereon, and this Court should likewise vacate
summary judgment on the same.
3.

Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel to IFG.

Estoppel theory was inapplicable
The District Court also found, inter alia, that Plaintiffs'
d against IFG for the first time in response
as against IFG, and that the Estoppel claim was raise
ting IFG Summary Judgment 8, 10, R. at
to IFG's Motion for Summary Judgment. Order Gran
als has held that, when a successor-in289, 291. On the first finding, the Idaho Court of Appe
an estoppel against its predecessor, the
interest had notice of the facts which would lead to
estoppel may be asserted against the successor.

Mikesell v. Newworld Development

(Ct. App. 1992) (applying the estoppel
Corporation, 122 Idaho 868, 874, 840 P.2d 1090, 1096
successor-in-interest). Further, although
exception to the Statute of Frauds against the vendor's
ant to the Lease, a direct analogy can
Appellants' claims and defenses are not brought pursu
e the same remedies against a lessor's
drawn to Idaho Code § 55-303, which allows a lesse
successor-in-interest with regard to a lease.
their oral agreement with Coeur
Here, Appellants alleged that IFG had knowledge of
would gain to benefit. Id. at 11 6.4-6.6,
d'Alene Placer, Complaint 1 2.22, R. at 10, and that IFG
favorable to the non-moving party, there
R. at 13. Viewing these allegations in a light most
not IFG was placed on sufficient notice in
arises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or
to remove the Nicholsons from the Subject
order to be likewise estopped from bringing an action
te the rejection of Appellants' offer to
Property. Furthermore, the failure to communica
a rational trier of fact could reasonably
Appellants either prior to, or following, the sale to IFG,
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re, this
find that the counter-claim was barred by the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel. Therefo
Court should likewise vacate and remand the grant of Summary Judgment.
With regard to the finding that Appellants raised the Estoppel argument against IFG for
Second
the first time on summary judgme nt, Appellants will call the Court's attention to their
Affirmative Defense raised in their Answer to IFG's Counterclaim:

Second Defense
Counter-claimant waived, or by its conduct, is barred in whole or in part
by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and consent from asserting the causes of
action contained in the Counter-claim.
that the
Answer to Counterclaim, page 3, R. at 126. If the Court, by this finding, was implying
Rule
Estoppel defense was waived for failure to raise as an affirmative defense pursuant to Idaho
claim
of Civil Procedure 8(c ), Appellants' pleading of the same in their Answer to IF G's Counter
as
would warrant a reversal of this finding, and denial of summary judgme nt on these grounds
well.

D.

The

Distn~~t

Court

Erred

in

Denying

Appellants'

Motion

for

Reconsideration.
As discussed above, Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration was denied. R. at 325. The

be in the
decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration has generally been held to
In
discretion of the trial court. Antim v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 251 P.3d 602, 610 (2011).
e court
reviewing a matter on appeal pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard, "the appellat
d the
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceive
of such
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries
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discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it;
and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id. In this case, the
issue surrounding the District Court's grant of reconsideration is whether or not the court "acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it."
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, the District Court failed to act "consistently with
[the] legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it." Therefore, the denial of
Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration was an abuse of discretion, and should likewise be
reversed.

IV.

CONCLUSIO N

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be
REVERSED, VACATED, and the matter REMANDED to the District Court with instructions
pursuant to the legal and equitable principles set forth hereinabove.
DATED this 29th day of April, 2016.
JAMES McMILLAN,

~{ \k-

X{torneyforAppeUant.
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